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RULES OF EVIDENCE
IN CASES INVOLVING
LACK OF DISCRETION
MSGR. JOSEPH G. GOODWINE*
N THIS PAPER we shall treat (1) the concept of matrimonial consent,
(2) the elements affecting matrimonial consent relative to the
validity of the marriage contract, and (3) the various rules of evidence
employed in formal trials which hear allegations of nullity on the basis
of mental incompetence.
Concept of Matrimonial Consent
Canon 1081 points out that the efficient cause of the matrimonial
contract-the factor that brings marriage into being-is the mutual
consent of the contractants.
The first section of this Canon states that the legitimately manifested
consent of the parties, who otherwise are free of any legal impediments
(iure habiles), brings the marriage into being. The second paragraph
gives the legal definition of matrimonial consent. It states that matri-
monial consent is a mutual act of the will by which the perpetual and
exclusive right to acts of normal sexual intercourse is granted. While
this right is the stated object of the contract, because marriage is
between human beings, and the ends of marriage as stated in Canon
1013, are the procreation and education of children, and because the
essential properties of marriage are unicity, or, exclusiveness, and in-
dissolubility, it is apparent that the proper object of the marriage
contract is the person himself. The individual alone is the fit subject
to assume, to sustain, and to fulfill the rights and obligations of
marriage. This is reflected in the liturgical formula for the exchange
of consent: "I, N.N., take thee, N.N., for my lawful husband (wife),
etc."
Although the Code of Canon Law specifically has not stated norms
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to guide judges in evaluating the mental
competence of parties entering marriage,
Rotal jurisprudence has certain guide-lines
to assist tribunals in this difficult area.
Originally, the Rule of Sanchez, named
for the renowned commentator, professed
that since "mere use of reason" was suffi-
cient for the positing of a human act (such
as the commission of a mortal sin) it
should also be considered as the critical
test for giving valid consent. According
to this theory, so long as a person is
functioning at a rational level and has the
minimal knowledge required in Canon
1082 (namely, that marriage is a per-
manent union from which children are
born) he is capable of entering a valid
contract.
In a decision rendered in 1911, not
only the use of reason, but also the ques-
tion of requisite knowledge of marriage
and its obligations, were seen as the critical
points. In 1919, the Rule of Sanchez was
formally rejected in favor of the norm of
St. Thomas Aquinas. At first, this norm
was interpreted as a test of knowledge.
However, as cases were subsequently pre-
sented wherein it was obvious that the
person had sufficient knowledge but, never-
theless, was simultaneously defective con-
cerning his internal liberty, it was seen
that both spiritual faculties-intellect and
will-are involved in the question of
giving valid consent. It was then recognized
that just as the functioning of the intellect
can be disrupted (e.g., by a disordered
imagination), so also the functioning of
the will can be affected by emotional
factors, by pathological phobias, by obses-
sions, etc.
The proper functioning of the rational
faculties sufficient for valid consent has,
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in recent Rotal jurisprudence, been re-
flected in the use of the terms "due dis-
cretion" and "mature judgment" so that,
in addition to "mere use of reason," there
is presently demanded the "critical" or
"discretionary" faculty as an indispensable
quality for true marital consent. This
latter faculty consists in the power of
balanced judgment and logical deduction,
and implies the ability not only to know
the obligations of the marriage contract
but also an appreciation of one's ability
to assume these obligations. It is also
generally conceded that this due discretion
comes not at the age of puberty but during
a person's mental development in later
years.
Conditions Affecting the Validity of
Matrimonial Consent
In general, any condition which seri-
ously impairs or completely destroys the
normal functioning of the intellect or will
automatically renders consent inefficacious.
Thus, ignorance of the nature and obliga-
tions of marriage, lack of consciousness at
the time of marriage, substantial error
regarding the identity of the other party,
and certain mental disorders and illnesses
vitiate proper consent on the part of the
intellect.
Insofar as the will is concerned, consent
may be rendered inefficacious by reason
of undue duress or fear, by a positive
exclusion of the marriage itself, or any of
its essential properties, as well as by con-
ditional consent which affects the sub-
stance of the marriage contract, and, as
mentioned above, by emotional factors
such as phobias and obsessions.
For the purpose at hand, we shall con-
centrate on the area of mental illness as
it affects a person's contractual ability. In
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general, this condition is called insanity
and affects a person's ability to elicit an
integral act of consent. Ecclesiastical
jurisprudence generally employs the term
"insanity" as referring to an habitual or
chronic condition which deprives the sub-
ject of the ability to use his rational
faculties. The term "lack of due discre-
tion," on the other hand, is all-inclusive,
in the sense that it embraces all psychic
disorders, whether chronic or transitory,
which render marriage null. This same
jurisprudence, without reference to the
clinical psychiatric classifications of various
illnesses, has grouped all psychic disorders
into the following three categories:
1. Habitual insanity - this group
comprises all mental disorders which are
permanent and totally debilitating;
2. Mental disturbance - this group
includes those illnesses which are per se
temporary, regardless of whether they
are totally or partially incapacitating;
3. Mental weakness or feeble-mind-
edness - this category embraces all
mental defects which,, per se, only par-
tially incapacitate, regardless of whether
the incapacity is permanent or temp-
orary.
These three concepts conveniently com-
prehend all possible psychotic disorders
or defects whatever may be, medically
speaking, their clinical diagnosis, etiology,
duration or gravity. This trichotomy is
utilized in procedural law to ascertain the
effect of mental illness on the validity of
the marriage bond. This is seen in the
correct application of principles and pre-
sumptions. For example, the presumption
of perpetuity and continuity is valid in
cases of habitual insanity but is not valid
in cases of mental disturbance. Again, the
hereditary factor might provide admissible
evidence in cases of mental deficiency but
not in the case of passing or temporary
disturbance.
Rules of Evidence
Evidence in cases involving mental in-
competence in marriage may be classified
in four categories: documents; presump-
tions; testimonial evidence; and opinions
of the tribunal's psychiatric experts.
Documents
Under the first heading may be grouped
any records pertaining to the respondent
which may have a bearing on the case.
Of first importance are the authentic
medical records of any treatments received
either before or after the marriage. Other
pertinent documents are school and em-
ployment records as well as any possible
criminal history.
Presumptions
A presumption is defined in canon law
as a probable inference about an uncertain
matter. Some presumptions are specifically
stated in the law, and these are called
legal presumptions; others are deductions
by the judge himself, and these are called
personal presumptions.
An example of the former is to be
found in Canons 1014 and 1015. There
it is stated that marriage enjoys the pre-
sumption of validity and, if the partners
live together after marriage, of consumma-
tion. Canon 1814 states that public docu-
ments, whether ecclesiastical or civil, are
presumed to be genuine. Obviously, such
presumptions admit proof to the contrary.
Personal presumptions vary in force,
directness and probability. In this matter,
the jurisprudence of the Sacred Roman
Rota is an important guide; e.g., proven
insanity shortly before and after marriage
strongly indicates the existence of insanity
at the time of marriage.
The importance of presumptions as
proof is seen especially in cases involving
mental illness. Obviously, marriages in-
volving a mentally ill person would not
exist if the respondent had exhibited clear
and readily recognized signs of illness at
the moment of the contract. Tribunals are
concerned with such cases simply because
the layman does not generally recognize
the symptoms of a disturbed mentality.
Certitude of the respondent's condition at
the moment of contract can be achieved,
for the most part, by relying on well-
founded presumptions which arise from
established facts.
Testimonial Evidence
Pertinent testimony is usually found in
the depositions of the plaintiff, of mem-
bers of the respondent's family, of co-
workers and associates, and of physicians
who treated the respondent.
Sworn testimony is recorded before a
judge or a panel of three judges. Every
diocese is required by law to have specific
accommodations for the recording of this
testimonial evidence. Besides accommoda-
tions for the personnel of the court and
the witnesses, a crucifix must be displayed
and a Bible must always be available.
Ordinarily, all formal testimony must
be taken at the site of the tribunal. From
this rule, however, distinguished ecclesi-
astical and civil officials are exempt.
Cardinals and Bishops may select a loca-
tion of their own choice, and persons
prevented from coming to the tribunal
because of illness or their particular state
in life receive special consideration. Clois-
tered nuns are permitted to testify in their
convent surroundings. Witnesses who live
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a great distance from the tribunal or who
reside outside the jurisdiction of a diocese,
may testify before a delegated tribunal in
their own vicinity.
The judicial examination is conducted
solely by the judge, and each witness is
interrogated in private. It is a rare excep-
tion when a plaintiff, or his Advocate, may
be permitted to attend the hearings of
witnesses. The officials usually present at
hearings are the examining judge (or
judges), the Defender of the Marriage
Bond, and a Notary. It is the duty of the
Notary to record the verbal testimony as
given and to transcribe the statements for
inclusion in the acts of the case.
The interrogation of a witness is pre-
ceded by the taking of an oath. If the
case warrants, an admonition by the judge
concerning the sacred character of an oath
and the nature of the ecclesiastical penal-
ties for deliberate perjury is given. A lay
witness who is guilty of perjury is punish-
able by personal interdict, which disquali-
fies him from worthy reception of the
sacraments, the sacramentals, and from
ecclesiastical burial; moreover, he is there-
after considered suspect in any ecclesias-
tical trial. While the testimony of a wit-
ness who refuses to take an oath may be
informative, his testimony cannot be ac-
corded great probative force. For proper
evaluation of such a statement, however,
notation of the refusal to testify under
oath must be made.
The interrogation of a witness is per-
formed in accordance with a questionnaire,
prepared previously by the Defender of
the Bond, which is submitted to the judge
in a sealed envelope at the hearing. This
questionnaire contains general questions
pertaining to the individual's identification
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(address, date and place of birth, parents'
names, religion, and occupation) and par-
ticular questions designed to elicit the
witness's knowledge pertaining to the case
at hand.
While the judge is obliged to follow
the Defender's formulary, in the interest
of obtaining full information, he is always
free to propose, ex officio, additional per-
tinent questions. Not infrequently in cases
involving mental illness, the judge would
be remiss if he did not ascertain precisely
what the witness observed, e.g., when the
oddity or symptom was observed, what
occasioned the oddity, and who else was
present at the specific time of the occur-
rence.
The law is specific in its rules governing
the interrogation of witnesses. First of all,
a witness must never be forewarned as to
the questions about to be proposed. The
primary purpose of all interrogations is
to ascertain the truth; hence, not even the
plaintiff's Advocate is permitted to prompt
his client as to the nature of the testimony
he should give. In the second place, all
questions must be simple and direct. The
judge must never badger, harass, or em-
barrass a witness, but must always conduct
himself with decorum and sympathetic
understanding. Testimony must be given
orally and without reference to manu-
script. At times, however, as in the case
of an expert or physician who has treated
a party, the judge may permit a witness
to consult written reports or records.
Leading questions which suggest answers
are strictly forbidden. Irrelevant questions
-those not pertinent to the case or not
understandable by a given witness-are
also specifically forbidden.
Upon the completion of the hearing,
the witness must read the transcript of
his testimony, and he is permitted to add,
delete, correct or change whatever he
may wish.
The actual method of transcribing testi-
mony is left to the discretion of the indi-
vidual tribunal, provided two requirements
are met: (1) an exact copy of the testi-
mony must be made available to the witness
for his perusal and signature; (2) the tran-
script must be available before the party
finally leaves the tribunal. When a witness
has stated that he has nothing further to
add, delete or change, he is required to
take an oath affirming the truth of his
statements and promising to observe
secrecy with reference to the testimony
given until the completion of the case.
The law requires that the testimony of
the plaintiff in a case be taken before that
of the witnesses, unless grave reason sug-
gests otherwise. Pertinent information will
be sought from the witnesses mentioned
by the plaintiff in his petition. Other
witnesses not mentioned by the plaintiff
may be called ex officio by the judge if,
in the opinion of the tribunal, they can
offer pertinent testimony. A witness should
possess knowledge concerning the facts
about which he is to testify, and he should
also possess probity and honesty of
character.
All persons may be witnesses unless
they are expressly debarred by law. Canon
law debars three classes of persons: (1)
the unfit; (2) the suspect; and (3) those
who are disqualified. Those who have not
attained the age of puberty (fourteen for
a boy, twelve for a girl), and persons who
are feeble-minded or mentally ill, are
regarded as unfit. Among the mentally
unfit are idiots, imbeciles, morons and
psychotics. Persons who have been ex-
communicated, perjurers, or those of ill-
repute are classified as suspect. Also
grouped in this category are persons of
such debased character that they are con-
sidered unworthy of belief, as well as
public and implacable enemies of either
party. The law considers the following
as disqualified: the parties in a case and
those who act in their stead. Among the
latter would be the Advocate for the
plaintiff, the Guardian for the respondent,
the personnel of the court, and all con-
fessors, even though released from the
sacramental seal.
Certain individuals are exempt from
giving testimony unless released from pro-
fessional secrecy. In this group will be
found priests who received information
outside of sacramental confession, civil
magistrates, physicians and civil lawyers.
Witnesses appearing voluntarily a n d
without citation may be permitted to
testify at the discretion of the judge. Since
witnesses ordinarily do not volunteer, the
judge must reject their offer if it appears
certain that their motive is but to delay
the proceedings or to obstruct justice.
The probative value of testimony natur-
ally depends on its proximate and true
reflection of the important facts in a case.
A point of paramount importance is the
precise time when certain facts occurred.
It is a recognized fact that when parties
learn that there may be a slight possibility
of impugning the validity of an unhappy
marriage they develop a dangerous and
uncanny ability to distort the truth. Hence,
canonists have designated a certain period
as a suspect time (tempus suspectum).
This may be defined as the time when
marital difficulties first arose, or when
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either party first discovered the possibility
of impugning the validity of their mar-
riage. The general principle in canon law
is that statements made by the parties at
non-suspect times are to be accorded
greater credence than statements made at
suspect times.
Because the cumulative effect of mere
numbers can often prove misleading,
judges should be particularly wary when
weighing statements that have but one
common source.
In order to avoid all suspicion of per-
jury, the veracity of the witnesses must
be ascertained. In evaluating the testi-
monial evidence, the judge should also
give heed to the status of a witness and to
his reputation for probity as well as to his
fidelity to religious practice. The judge
should ascertain whether testimony is de-
rived from personal knowledge or merely
based on hearsay; whether a witness is
consistent or vacillating. The testimony
of the relatives of a mentally ill person is
often suspect because of their general
inability or unwillingness to observe signs
of unusual speech or behavior. The state-
ments of a qualified witness, when testify-
ing to what has been done in his official
capacity, are considered to be indisputable
proof.
Opinions of Psychiatric Experts
Church courts are enjoined by law to
engage the services of psychiatric experts.
They must be men of integrity and reli-
gious character, and they must be eminently
skilled in the intricacies of their profession.
Wherever possible, the experts should
conduct a personal examination of the
respondent and evaluate the available
evidence relating to his mental compe-
(Continued on page 86)
 
